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Abstract
We consider the classic Allingham and Sandmo (1972) tax compliance problem in the context of the
Choquet-Schmeidler Expected Utility (CSEU) model, using the Non—Extremal Outcome (NEO)-
additive capacities proposed by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2004), in which Knightian
uncertainty (ambiguity) exists concerning the penalty rate faced in the case of an audit. Pessimistic
incarnations of the CSEU model can yield much lower underreporting rates than its Expected Utility
(EU) counterpart, and do so without the need for moral sentiments, social stigma or probability
perception functions. We conﬁrm previous results, obtained in other contexts, showing that
ambiguity-aversion reinforces the incentive eﬀects of risk-aversion. We deﬁne the concept of a Risk-
preserving increase in ambiguity (RPIA), which allows us to consider a change in the distribution of
penalty rates such that (i) a CSEU decisionmaker will perceive a change in her welfare, whereas (ii)
an EU decisionmaker will not. We also present simulation results that support the view according
to which ambiguity aversion explains the use of accounting ﬁrms in preparing tax returns. Finally,
by modeling a simple game between the taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), we show
that increasing ambiguity in the tax code will not be in the IRS’s interest if the associated rise
in the cost of auditing is suﬃciently large. It is therefore likely that increasing complexity (and
therefore ambiguity) will reduce tax receipts, even in the presence of ambiguity-averse taxpayers.
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also applies.1 Introduction
Recent work by Bernasconi (1998), Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004) and Arcand and Rota-
Graziosi (2004) has shown that pessimism concerning audit rates, formalized using the Rank
Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) model or Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), can
explain the abnormally high tax compliance rates observed in practice, abnormal, that is, in
terms of an Expected Utility (EU) interpretation (see Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998)
for a survey).1 The purpose of this paper, in contrast, is threefold.
First, we extend the standard Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of tax compliance as
ag a m b l et os i t u a t i o n so fambiguity,a l s ok n o w na sKnightian uncertainty. This will allow
us to ascertain the degree to which ambiguity aversion reinforces risk aversion, and can
therefore contribute something to explaining the tax compliance puzzle. That ambiguity
aversion reinforces risk aversion has been shown in other contexts (see Mukerji and Tallon
(2004) for a survey).
Second, we highlight the use of professional accountants in preparing tax returns, where
their role is interpreted as being one of eliminating or at least reducing the ambiguity as-
sociated with the tax compliance gamble. By making use of an accountant, the taxpayer
essentially tilts the world towards one characterized by risk, rather than one characterized
by uncertainty. In particular, we compute the willingness to pay for eliminating ambiguity,
and distinguish between the "pure" ambiguity premium and the "aggregate" premium which
includes the eﬀect of risk.
Third, we go beyond the basic Allingham and Sandmo (1972) framework, and consider
an extremely simple game in which the tax authorities choose an audit probability and the
taxpayer her degree of compliance (Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde (1986)). The properties
of the equilibrium under ambiguity (EUA) of this game imply that, when the decrease in
1 In the EU model, strictly positive underreporting will obtain when the expected gain to evasion (the
probability of not being audited minus the probability of being audited times the penalty rate one incurs on
undeclared income) is positive: in most countries, this expected gain is indeed positive, but most taxpayers
engage in no underreporting at all.
1the cost of an audit caused by simpliﬁcation of the tax code (and thus the elimination of
ambiguity) is suﬃciently large, it will be in the interest of the tax authorities to eliminate
ambiguity in the tax code, despite its deterrence eﬀect in terms of taxpayer compliance in
a partial equilibrium setting. All of our theoretical results are, when possible, confronted
with empirical evidence for the US.
Our focus on the ambiguity of the tax code is motivated empirically by the important
public policy implications of the issue. For example, the Cato Institute states that:
Income taxes are hard to understand and the rules now span 60,044 pages....
Americans are baﬄed by the complex rules on capital gains, savings plans, edu-
cation incentives, and other items.... Tax complexity is getting worse.... Citizens
are required to comply with the tax laws, but that is diﬃcult when the rules are
constantly changing.
Few would argue with the statement that tax codes, in the US and other OECD countries,
are unduly complex, and in the US case, the issue was recently brought to the forefront of
public debate by the widely publicized report of the National Taxpayer Advocate (2004):2
Without a doubt, the largest source of compliance burdens for taxpayers
and the IRS alike is the overwhelming complexity of the tax code, and without a
doubt, the only meaningful way to reduce these compliance burdens is to simplify
the tax code enormously.
Given this state of aﬀairs, is it reasonable to assume, ﬁrst, that taxpayers know the
penalty rates that apply in diﬀerent circumstances when tax is underreported and, second,
that taxpayers are able to assign probabilities to the various potential outcomes they may
be confronted with?
We pose these two questions at the outset because they are key assumptions of the stan-
dard EU approach to tax compliance. We believe that both assumptions are unreasonable,
and that the EU approach therefore ignores important aspects of taxpayer behavior. The
alternative proposed in this paper is therefore to place the ambiguity of the tax code, gener-
ated by its complexity, at the heart of the analysis, using the Choquet-Schmeidler Expected
2 The full report is available online at: http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article/0„id=133967,00.html
2Utility (CSEU) model developed by Schmeidler (1989). We also choose to focus on uncer-
tainty concerning the penalty rate, though an alternative would be to focus on uncertainty
concerning the marginal tax rate.3
T h es t r u c t u r eo ft h er e m a i n d e ro ft h ep a p e ri sa sf o l l o w s . I np a r t2 ,w ep r e s e n tt h e
assumptions under which we shall be working, and specify preferences in terms of the CSEU
model with NEO-additive capacities recently proposed by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and
Grant (2004). In part 3 we specify the tax-compliance gamble in the context of CSEU
preferences with NEO-additive capacities, with an uncertain penalty rate, and characterize
optimal compliance behavior (Proposition 1). I np a r t4w es t u d yt h ei m p a c to fc h a n g e si nt h e
distribution of the penalty rate on compliance behavior. The changes in the distribution
of penalty rates we consider are all meant as proxies for a change in the complexity of
the tax code. In turn, we consider: (i) a mean preserving increase in the risk of the
distribution of penalty rates (Proposition 2), (ii) an α−squeeze in the distribution of penalty
rates (Proposition 4), and we introduce (iii) the concept of a "risk preserving increase in
the ambiguity" of the distribution of penalty rates (Proposition 5). In passing, we verify
that the results obtained in the CSEU context are robust (Proposition 3) to a switch to
alternative axiomatics provided by the "smooth model of ambiguity aversion" of Klibanoﬀ,
Marinacci, and Mukerji (2004). All of these results conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings (summarized
in Mukerji and Tallon (2004)) that ambiguity-aversion (when pessimism prevails) tends to
reinforce the eﬀects of risk-aversion. We also provide empirical evidence which suggests
that a pessimistic CSEU model with NEO-additive capacities provides a good explanation
for observed patterns of underreporting in th eU So v e rt h ep a s th a l fc e n t u r y . I np a r t5 ,
we provide a general characterization of the risk and ambiguity premia in the CSEU with
NEO-additive capacities case (Lemma 3), and apply the result to the tax-compliance context
(Proposition 5). Finally, in part 6, we specify the interaction between the taxpayer and
the IRS in a simple game-theoretic construct (in which the taxpayer chooses her level of
3 Our paper also extends the results obtained in an EU setting by Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992b) to
aC S E Us e t t i n g .
3underreporting and the IRS chooses the audit probability), and analyze the impact on the
resulting equilibrium of changes in the distribution of penalty rates. Of particular interest
in this context is how changes in the distribution of penalty rates aﬀect the cost of an audit
for the IRS. We prove (Proposition 6) that an increase in complexity (as proxied by a mean
preserving increase in the risk of penalty rates) will increase equilibrium underreporting
when the resulting increase in the cost of an audit is suﬃcient to oﬀset the deterrence eﬀect
on taxpayers of increased complexity.
2 Capacities and Choquet-Schmeidler expected utility
In this paper, it will be convenient to focus our attention on Non-Extremal Outcome addi-
tive capacities (henceforth "NEO-additive") deﬁned by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant
(2004). Following these authors, we shall place ourselves in a situation of uncertainty:
a state of nature will obtain, but we will be unable to say deﬁnitely which one. Let
S = {s0,s 1,...,si,...,s n} be the ﬁnite set of states of nature. Consider the set of subsets of
S,d e n o t e db yE =2 S, which we shall refer to as the set of events.L e t X : S → R with
s → X(s). Then a capacity is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 ν : A ∈ E → ν(A) ∈ [0,1] is a capacity if ν(∅)=0 , ν(S)=1 , and A ⊆ B ⇒
ν(A) 6 ν(B); ν is convex if ν(A ∪ B)+ν(A ∩ B) > ν(A)+ν(B),∀A,B ∈ E.








1 for E = ∅
0 otherwise .
Let π be a probability distribution deﬁned over E. If we assume that π is objectively
given, then the CSEU model with Neo-additive capacity is equivalent to the model of Cohen
(1992) under risk. We use the following deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 3 (Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2004), Deﬁnition 3.2) Let γ, λ be real
numbers such that 0 6 γ 6 1, 0 6 λ 6 1 − γ. Then a NEO-additive capacity ν is deﬁned
by ν (E |π,γ,λ)=γµ0 (E)+λµ1 (E)+( 1− λ − γ)π(E), ∀E ∈ E.
4Let X ∈ V where V = {X : S → R}. The Choquet-Schmeidler Expected Utility (CSEU)
is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4 (Choquet (1953), Schmeidler (1986)) Let X = x0A∗
0 + ... + xiA∗
i + ...xnA∗
n,
where Ai is a partition of S and A∗





1 if s ∈ A
0 otherwise
and where we rank xn 6 ... 6 xi 6 ... 6 x1 6 x0. Then the CSEU of the gamble is
given by
R
u(X)dν = u(xn)+(u(xn−1) − u(xn))ν(X > xn−1)+...+(u(xi−1) − u(xi))ν(X >
xi−1)+... +( u(x0) − u(x1))ν(X > x0).
In the case of NEO-additive capacities, the expectation of u(.) with respect to the NEO-
additive capacity ν (.), is also given by the Choquet integral, which takes a particularly
intuitive form:
Lemma 1 (Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2004), Lemma 3.1) The CSEU of a simple
function f : S −→ R with respect to the NEO-additive capacity ν (E |π,γ,λ) is given by:




f +( 1− λ − γ)Eπ [f], ∀E ∈ E.
The sum γ + λ represents the amount of perceived ambiguity, 1 − γ − λ is the degree
of conﬁdence in the belief π. I nw h a tf o l l o w sw eu s et h el a c ko fc o n ﬁdence in the belief
represented by π as one of the main explanatory factors for the demand for professional
accountant’s services.
3 Tax compliance under Choquet-Schmeidler expected
utility with NEO-additive capacities
Consider the standard Allingham and Sandmo (1972) tax compliance problem, where we
allow for diﬀerent potential penalty rates, denoted by θi,i=1 ,...,n, with θ1 <θ 2 < ... <
θi <θ i+1 < ... < θn. Let y denote after-tax income, t the marginal tax rate and z the extent
of underreporting. Then the gamble faced by the taxpayer involves monetary outcomes that
can be ranked, for z > 0, as y − θntz 6 ... 6 y − θitz 6 ... 6 y − θ2tz 6 y − θ1tz 6 y + tz,
5where y −θitz represents the outcome when an audit obtains and penalty rate θi is applied,
whereas y + tz represents the outcome in the absence of an audit.4 We assume that the
probability of audit is known to the taxpayer and equal to p, while the (unknown) probability
of facing penalty rate θi i nt h ec a s eo fa na u d i ti se q u a lt oqi,w i t h
Pi=n
i=1 qi =1 .
Note that the problem here is more complex than in the standard model. The taxpayer
has the choice between reporting her true income and avoiding penalties (her gain in this case
is known and certain) or underreporting her income and facing an audit which could lead to
penalties of an uncertain magnitude. The key insight from the modelling that follows is that
the taxpayer’s behavior is not only driven by risk-aversion: it is driven by ambiguity-aversion
as well, since the probabilities with which the diﬀerent penalty rates obtain are unknown.
Applying CSEU with NEO—additive capacities to the tax compliance problem yields the





γu(y − θntz)+λu(y − θ1tz)






 +( 1− p)u(y + tz). (1)
When it is convenient, we shall replace the discrete speciﬁcation in terms of
Pi=n
i=1 qiu(y − θitz)
by a continuous formulation of the form
R θn
θ1 u(y − θtz)q(θ)dθ,w h e r eq(θ) denotes the prob-
ability density function (p.d.f.) according to which θ is distributed. In terms of optimal
compliance behavior, one can then readily establish the following result:
Proposition 1 Let µθ denote the mean penalty rate, σ2
θ its variance, and let A(y)=−
u00(y)
u0(y).









θ)), when p<p CSEU (γ,λ)= 1
1+θnγ+θ1λ+(1−γ−λ)µθ,a n dz∗
CSEU (γ,λ)=
0,o t h e r w i s e .
Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x .
Optimal compliance behavior under CSEU with NEO—additive capacities yields several
well-known special cases (see Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2004)) by restricting
4 This formulation of the problem, in which the total penalty is proportional to the amount evaded, is
due to a classic paper by Yitzhaki (1974).
6t h ev a l u e st a k e no nb yγ and λ.5 For γ = λ =0we obtain the EU solution z∗
EU =
z∗





θ).6 The restriction 0 <γ6 1,λ=0yields the simple capacity










θ).7 Gajdos, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2004) extend the Gilboa-
Schmeidler maxmin expected utility model, yielding a speciﬁcation that is functionally equiv-
alent to this case, where the parameter γ is interpreted as being the degree of "ambiguity-
aversion" of the decisionmaker (also see Mukerji (1997)). When γ =1 ,λ=0 ,w h i c hc o r -
responds to a situation called "pure pessimism", z∗















Finally, when γ + λ =1 ,o n eo b t a i n sz∗







Let pEU denote the threshold value of the audit probability below which positive un-














(1 − p)[µθ (1 + µθ + µ2
θ + σ2
θ)+σ2
θ] − (1 − p + µ2
θ + σ2
θ) − (1 − p − pµθ)θ
2
1
(1 − p − pµθ)θ
2
n +( 1− p + µ2
θ + σ2





These inequalities are suggestive of how pessimistic CSEU preferences can provide an
5 Note that we restrict our attention to the case where the audit rate p is known by the taxpayer.
This situation is similar to the one considered in the Ellsberg (1961) paradox: the taxpayer knows p, but
does not know the penalty rate she will face, the only restriction being that qi ∈ [0,1].A n a l t e r n a t i v e
speciﬁcation would involve having the taxpayer not know p while restricting its value ap r i o r ito some
interval, such as p ∈ [0,p]. As an illustration, consider the "pessimistic" case where λ =0and γ =1 . Then
CSEU (1,0) = pu(y − θntz)+( 1− p)u(y + tz). An example of reasonable prior beliefs would simply be
that the probability of being audited is lower than the probability of not being audited (p 6 1 − p), leading
to p = 1
2 and CSEU (1,0) = 1
2u(y − θntz)+1
2u(y + tz). In this case, the taxpayer not only restricts her
attention to the highest possible penalty rate: she also attributes a weight of 1
2 to the likelihood of being
audited and paying penalty rate θn.I f p>1
2, it is trivial to show that the taxpayer always chooses z∗ =0 .
6 In the standard case, σ2
θ =0and µθ = θ.
7 Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2004) refer to this case as being one of "pure pessimism", and do
not consider the case where γ =1and λ =0 . Dow and Werlang (1992) and Dow and Werlang (1994) also
explicitly consider the simple capacity case in which λ =1− γ.
7explanation for the tax compliance puzzle: if the ratio γ/λ is suﬃciently large, a CSEU
taxpayer will engage in no underreporting at all for lower audit probabilities than her EU
counterpart, and when they both engage in positive underreporting, the CSEU taxpayer
underreports less.
In order to illustrate Proposition 1 in quantitative terms that are reasonably close to
reality, consider the three-point distribution of penalty rates given by (q1,θ 1; 1−q1 −qn,µ θ;
qn,θ n).8 A plausible parameterization that corresponds roughly to US data involves θ1 =0
with a probability of 0.5, and a mean penalty rate of around 20-25%, with the three proba-




y ) is simulated for this distribution of penalty rates, for various values of λ and γ,a s
af u n c t i o no fp. As should be clear, underreporting is much lower under CSEU preferences
as long as γ is signiﬁcantly greater than 0, and z∗
CSEU(0.1,0.8) still lies below the EU case.

















2.I f w e s o l v e f o r t h e m a x i m u m





θ−q1(µθ−θ1)2,θ n = θ1 +
σ2
θ
q1(µθ−θ1). Note that a maximum penalty rate (θn)o f2 . 8g r e a t l y
exceeds the maximum civil penalty rate of 25 percent of unpaid tax (75 percent in the case of fraud) that is
currently used in the U.S. However, in certain situations the IRS may also initiate audits of returns from two
prior tax years in addition to the current year (so-called “back audits”). Moreover, if fees paid to taxpayer
representatives are included along with the potential loss of social standing, a maximum “penalty” rate of














Figure 1: Optimal compliance behavior,
z∗
CSEU(γ,λ)
y , for u(x)=x1−R
1−R ,R=1 .8,y=1 0 0 ,
t =0 .3,θ 1 =0 ,q 1 =0 .5,θ n =2 .8,q n ' 0.05 ,µ θ =0 .25,σ 2
θ =0 .35.
4 Compliance behavior and changes in the distribution
of penalty rates
One of the main purposes of this paper is to ascertain how changes in the ambiguity of the
tax code could aﬀect taxpayer welfare and compliance behavior. It is therefore particularly
important to study the impact of changes in the distribution of penalty rates that can
be interpreted as representing changes in ambiguity, as opposed to changes in γ and λ,
which correspond to the perception of ambiguity by the decisionmaker. In what follows,
we study the eﬀects of three diﬀerent changes in the distribution of penalty rates: (i) a
9mean-preserving increasing in its risk, (ii) a squeeze in the distribution of penalty rates and,
(iii) a change in penalty rates that aﬀects the extremal outcomes while leaving the moments
of the distribution unchanged. Each change in the distribution of penalty rates that we
consider corresponds to a diﬀerent interpretation of what is meant by ambiguity per se,a n d
how one chooses, or not, to distinguish it from risk.
4.1 A mean-preserving increase in risk in the distribution of θ
Gajdos, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2004) model the "degree of imprecision" in the distribution
of a random variable (interpreted by them as a prior) by its risk as deﬁn e db yR o t h s c h i l da n d
Stiglitz (1970), in the context of their extension of the Gilboa-Schmeidler maxmin preference
functional where 0 <γ6 1,λ =0 .9 The maximum degree of imprecision in their model
is given by the completely uninformative (uniform) prior q(θi)=1
n,∀i. It therefore seems
natural to model an increase in ambiguity by an increase in risk in the present context as
well.
4.1.1 Preliminaries
Consider a Mean-Preserving Increase in the Risk (MPIR) of the distribution of penalty
rates, deﬁned by the usual integral conditions: (i)
R θn




0 ∈ [θ1,θ n],w h e r eQ(θ,ρ) is the cumulative density function (c.d.f.) associated with
q(θ,ρ), Qρ(θ,ρ) is the derivative of the c.d.f. with respect to ρ,a n dρ is the parameter of
increasing risk of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Other concepts of MPIRs of a distribution
are considered in Chateauneuf, Cohen, and Meilijson (2004).10
9 More explicitly, the Gajdos, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2004) evaluation of the tax compliance gamble
would be given by GTV EU = p
h
γu(y − θntz)+( 1− γ)
R θn
θ1 u(y − θtz)q(θ,ρ)dθ
i
+( 1− p)u(y + tz) where
they would refer to γ as the taxpayer’s degree of imprecision-aversion, and ρ is the Rothschild-Stiglitz
parameter of increasing risk.
10 Note, by construction, that µθ is independent of ρ, whereas two integrations by parts of the de-
ﬁnition of σ2









dθ > 0. An increase in risk therefore increases variance, which will be
useful in the context of the second-order approximations used in this paper, and in many of the simulations
that we present. The converse is of course not necessarily true (i.e. an increase in σ2
θ does not necessarily
10We will use two standard results associated with MPIRs, which we summarize in the
following Lemma:
Lemma 2 (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), Laﬀont (1990), Theorem 2, p. 28) Consider an


























Part (i) of the Lemma is sometimes referred to as the Fundamental Theorem of Risk,
whereas part (ii) often allows one to sign comparative statics unambiguously.
4.1.2 The impact of an MPIR under CSEU with NEO-additive capacities
Applying Lemma 2 to the CSEU objective function given in (1) immediately yields the
following result:
Proposition 2 Let the distribution of penalty rates be parameterized by its risk ρ,i nt h e
sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Then: (i) the taxpayer’s welfare, evaluated at
the optimum, is decreasing in ρ: d
dρCSEU(γ,λ;z) 6 0; (ii) optimal underreporting is also
decreasing in ρ: d
dρz∗
CSEU(γ,λ) 6 0.
Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x .
Proposition 2(ii) is a general result that does not hinge upon the second-order ap-
proximation to z∗
CSEU(γ,λ) given in Proposition 1. Note however that optimal under-










dρ < 0. This result establishes that, when an increase in ambiguity
is modelled as an MPIR in the distribution of penalty rates, ambiguity-aversion reinforces
risk-aversion by deterring underreporting.








Figure 2: Welfare at the optimum under CSEU as a function of σ2
θ,f o r :
u(x)=−e−νx
ν ,ν=0 .05,y=1 0 0 ,t=0 .3,p=0 .03, θ1 =0 ,q 1 =0 .5, µθ =0 .25,σ 2
θ ∈ [0,3].
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, where we simulate taxpayer welfare,
evaluated at the optimum, as well as optimal underreporting as a fraction of income, as
functions of σ2
θ,w h e r eθ is assumed to follow the same three point distribution that was used
previously. The most striking aspect of Figure 2 is how welfare falls much faster for CSEU
taxpayers as compared with the EU case, as σ2
θ increases. The same pattern emerges for











Figure 3: Optimal compliance behaviour under CSEU, as a function of σ2
θ,f o rt h es a m e
parameterization as in Figure 2.
4.1.3 Alternative axiomatics: smooth ambiguity aversion
How robust is the result presented in Proposition 2, in terms of the deterrent eﬀect of
ambiguity when the latter takes the form of an MPIR? In order to provide a partial answer to
this question, we consider an alternative model that is not based on NEO-additive capacities,
but which nevertheless formulates an increase in ambiguity in terms of an MPIR. The model
in question is that of "smooth ambiguity aversion" recently proposed by Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci,
and Mukerji (2004).
In the interest of tractability, we restrict our attention to a situation in which the penalty
rate can take on two values, θ1 and θn, with associated probabilities 1−q and q. The smooth









p[qu(y − θntz)+( 1− q)u(y − θ1tz)]

















,a n dφ(.) is a twice-diﬀerentiable function. Ambiguity-aversion
corresponds to φ
00(.) < 0. A straightforward application of Lemma 2 allows one to establish
the following result:
Proposition 3 Assume that the taxpayer’s preferences can be described by the smooth ambi-
guity aversion model of Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2004). Then, for an ambiguity-
averse taxpayer: (i) dSAA




Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x .
Proposition 3 shows that the results obtained in Proposition 2 concerning the impact of
an increase in ambiguity on taxpayer welfare and underreporting are robust to a change in
















Figure 4: Optimal compliance behaviour as a function of ambiguity, when the probability
q of facing penalty rate θn is given by the Beta distribution, and: u(x)=−e−νx
ν , ν =0 .05,
φ(x)=−e−αx
α , α =0 .4, y =8 , t =0 .3, p =0 .03, θ1 =0 ,θ n =3 , µq =0 .25.
In Figure 4, we illustrate Proposition 3 under the assumption that f(q;.) is given by
a Beta distribution
Γ(D+B)
Γ(D)Γ(B)qD−1(1 − q)B−1,0 <q<1,D,B > 0,w i t hu(x)=−e−νx
ν and
φ(x)=−e−αx
α . Explicit computation of the objective function given in (4), optimization
with respect to z, and the application of a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion to the FOC allows one
to solve for optimal underreporting in closed form, which we simulate in Figure 4 for diﬀerent
v a l u e so ft h ev a r i a n c eo fq (σ2
q = DB
(D+B)2(D+B+1)) while maintaining µq = D
D+B constant.11
Each curve corresponds to a diﬀe r e n tv a l u eo ft h ec o e ﬃcient of absolute ambiguity aversion:
the greater the degree of absolute ambiguity aversion, the lower the level of underreporting.
Though the interpretation of an MPIR in the distribution of penalty rates as also corre-
11 See the Appendix for details of these computations.
15sponding to an increase in ambiguity is compelling, it fails to hone in on the most striking
aspect of the CSEU with NEO-additive capacities preference functional: the importance of
the extrema. We therefore turn to a particular form of MPIR, referred to as a squeeze,
which will explicitly aﬀect θ1 and θn.
4.2 A squeeze in the distribution of θ
Consider an α−squeeze (Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004)) in the distribution of penalty
rates. This is a special case of an MPIR, but which changes the support of the distribution.







The resulting distribution qα(θ) will be more concentrated around the mean µθ (which
will remain unchanged), its variance will be equal to α2σ2
θ, while the support of the squeezed
distribution will be given by [αθ1 +[ 1− α]µθ,αθ n +[ 1− α]µθ] ⊆ [θ1,θ n].
A squeeze introduces greater heterogeneity in taxpayer response because there can be
interesting interactions between the impact of the squeeze on the variance of penalty rates,
versus its impact on the extrema. For an optimistic taxpayer, for example, an increase in α
increases variance, thereby reducing underreporting, while the increase in α also reduces the
minimal value of the penalty rate, thereby resulting in greater underreporting In the limit
case of a perfectly optimistic taxpayer (γ =0 ,λ =1 ), the ﬁrst eﬀect vanishes altogether,
and the impact of an increase in α will be unambiguously to increase underreporting. The
converse is true for a perfectly pessimistic taxpayer (γ =1 ,λ=0 ).
The preceding argument implies that the impact of a change in α is, in the general case,
ambiguous, and depends upon the values taken on by γ and λ. One may then state the
following:
Proposition 4 Consider an α−squeeze in the distribution of penalty rates. Then: (i)
d
dαz∗
CSEU(0,0) 6 0; (ii) d
dαz∗
CSEU(1,0) 6 0; (iii) d
dαz∗
CSEU(0,1) > 0.M o r e o v e r , ∃ γc (λ,α)
such that d
dαz∗
CSEU(γ,λ) 6 0,f o rγ>γ c (λ,α).
Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x .
16An illustration of Proposition 4 is given in the right-hand panel of Figure 5 where we
assume that q(θ) is given by the arcsin density (q(θ)= 1
π
√
θ(1−θ),0 <θ<1), which is
represented for diﬀerent values of α in the left-hand panel. In this case, one can solve








M2 +4 α2p(2(9p − 8)λ + α(1 + λ)[(3p − 2) + αpλ])
´
,
where M =4( 4+α)−p(18 + 6α + α2). As one would expect from Proposition 4, optimal
underreporting is increasing in α for a perfectly optimistic CSEU taxpayer, while an EU
taxpayer and CSEU taxpayers that display a suﬃcient degree of pessimism will see their
































Figure 5: Optimal compliance behaviour for penalty rates distributed according to the
arcsin density (q(θ)= 1
π
√
θ(1−θ),0 <θ<1), with the following parameterization:
u(x)=−e−νx
ν , ν =0 .5,y=1 0 , t =0 .3, p =0 .03, θ1 =0 , θn =3 .
4.3 Risk-preserving increases in ambiguity
The characterizations of increases in ambiguity used so far have involved two concepts of
MPIRs. We now consider whether it is possible to construct a change in the distribution
17of penalty rates such that (i) a CSEU decisionmaker will perceive a change in her welfare,
whereas (ii) an EU decisionmaker will not. Given that the EU preference functional is
aﬀected by changes in the risk of the distribution of penalty rates, we wish to consider changes
in the distribution that aﬀect its extrema (θ1 and θn), while leaving the
Pi=n
i=1 qiu(y − θitz)
term unchanged. We shall refer to such a change as a "risk-preserving increase in ambiguity"
(RPIA), which we deﬁne as follows:
Deﬁnition 6 Consider a random variable distributed according to the p.d.f. q(θ,∆) over
the interval [θ1−∆,θ n+∆]. Then the distribution q(θ,∆0) will be said to be more ambiguous
than q(θ,∆), for constant risk up to the nth moment about the mean (RPIA(n)), when: (i)
∆0 > ∆,( i i )
R θn+∆
θ1−∆ (θ − µθ)
r q(θ,∆)dθ =
R θn+∆0
θ1−∆0 (θ − µθ)
r q(θ,∆0)dθ,∀r =1 ,...,n.
Ensuring that the nth moment about the mean remains constant under an RPIA involves
solving an nth degree polynomial equation. For most applications, in which second- or third-
order approximations suﬃc e ,t h i sp r o c e d u r ei ss i m p l et oi m p l e m e n t . A sa ni l l u s t r a t i o n ,
consider once again the three point distribution of penalty rates (q1,θ 1; 1 − q1 − qn,µ θ;
qn,θ n). Then the distribution given by

   

q1qn(θn−θ1)2







(θn−θ1+2∆)[q1(θn−θ1)+(q1+qn)∆],θ n + ∆

   

(5)
displays the ﬁrst two moments which are identical to the initial distribution, but is deﬁned
over a wider interval: the minimum value of the penalty rate has fallen by ∆, while the
maximum value has increased by ∆. The distribution given in (5) is therefore an RPIA(2)









Figure 6: Optimal compliance behaviour, when ∆ varies between 0 and 0.2,w i t ht h e
following parameterization: u(x)=−e−νx
ν ,ν=0 .05,y=1 0 , t =0 .3,p=0 .03, θ1 =0 .2,
q1 =0 .5, µθ =0 .25, σ2
θ =0 .08.
The eﬀect of an RPIA(2) in the distribution of penalty rates, when the distribution is
given by (5), is simulated in Figure 6, as we vary ∆ between 0 and 0.2 (the initial value
of θ1 is now equal to 0.2, and we modify the other parameters of the distribution so as to
maintain a mean penalty rate of around 25%). As was the case for the α−squeeze, there
is a threshold conﬁguration of the parameters γ and λ for which the RPIA has no impact
on compliance behavior: the increase in underreporting caused by the fall in the minimal
penalty rate (θ1 − ∆)a s∆ increases, is just oﬀset by the fall in underreporting caused by
t h ei n c r e a s ei nt h em a x i m a lp e n a l t yr a t eθn + ∆. In contrast to the α−squeeze, however,
there is no impact on the variance of the distribution of penalty rates.
In Figure 6, z∗
CSEU(0,1) and z∗
CSEU(0.1,0.8) display suﬃcient optimism for underre-
porting to be increasing in ∆ (that z∗
CSEU(0.1,0.8) is increasing in ∆ is not particularly
apparent in visual terms in the Figure). In contrast, z∗
CSEU(0.6,0.1) and z∗
CSEU(1,0) cor-
19respond to taxpayers who are suﬃciently pessimistic for underreporting to be decreasing
in ∆; z∗
CSEU(0,0) = z∗
EU is, by the very deﬁnition of an RPIA2 in the present context of
second-order approximations, invariant to changes in ∆.
The upshot of our consideration of the eﬀect of various measures of ambiguity on compli-
ance behavior is that increasing ambiguity deters underreporting when taxpayers are suﬃ-
ciently pessimistic, though care must be taken in separating the eﬀect of changes in the risk
of the distribution from changes in the extrema. An MPIR, deﬁned in the usual manner,
only aﬀects the former, an RPIA only aﬀects the latter, while an α−squeeze aﬀects both.
4.4 Gustave Choquet comes to America
How does the CSEU model fare, in terms of its ability to predict true compliance rates over
the long term, when compared to the EU benchmark? In Figure 7, we present simulation
results for the underreporting rate (z/y) for the US over the past half-century (1947-2002),
which we compare to the "true" underreporting rate. The empirical counterpart to z is
given here by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) "AGI [Adjusted Gross Income]
wage gap for wage and salary income", which represents the diﬀerence between the BEA’s
estimate of wages and salaries and taxpayer-reported wages and salaries. This measure is
then adjusted to account for "legitimate non-ﬁlers" (mainly low-income individuals who are
not required to ﬁle a tax return) using evidence from the 1988 TCMP study.
The BEA annually estimates a total AGI gap as well as component “gap” measures
including employee wages and salaries as well as farm and non-farm proprietor income. Al-
though previous studies have used the total AGI gap as a measure of noncompliance (Crane
and Nourzad (1986), Engel and Hines (1999)), the farm and non-farm proprietor gap esti-
mates rely exclusively on tax return data making the total AGI gap a less reliable evasion
measure. However, the wage AGI gap is based on independent estimates of wage income
reported by employees to the IRS and by employers to state employment agencies. There-
fore, due to its high relative degree of accuracy, the wage AGI gap is a preferred measure
20of income underreporting. Bloomquist (2003) describes the methodology used to derive the
modiﬁed wage gap.














Figure 7: Simulation results on US data, 1947-2000.
The tax rate (t) is a weighted average marginal tax rate on ordinary income (excluding
social security and medicare). Income (y)i sg i v e nb yt h eC e n s u sB u r e a u ’ sC u r r e n tP o p u l a -
tion Survey estimate of median wage and salary income. The audit probability p is given by
the "face to face" audit rate, as published by the IRS.12 We shall assume that the penalty
rate is distributed according to the three point distribution used earlier. The utility function
used in the simulation is of the CARA class.












CSEU(0.8,0.2) 0.411 0.894 0.908
z∗
CSEU(1,0) 0.449 0.838 0.856 0.993
mean 0.023 0.038 0.038 0.031 0.030
std. deviation 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.007
























CSEU(1,0) R2 =0 .202,σ =0 .008
Table 1: Actual and simulated underreporting rates for the United States, 1947-2001 (for
regression results, t-statistics in parentheses under coeﬃcients)
As should be clear from Figure 7, z∗
CSEU(1,0), the most pessimistic speciﬁcation, performs
best in terms of visually tracking the "true" rate of underreporting. This is conﬁrmed
formally in Table 1, where we present a simple statistical assessment of the capacity of
diﬀerent parameterizations of the CSEU model to explain the US data. The correlation
between z∗
CSEU(1,0) and actual data (0.449) is the highest amongst all of the alternatives
considered (the corresponding correlation for EU is 0.241) and a regression of the actual value
of underreporting on a constant and the simulated series yields an R2 for z∗
CSEU(1,0) of 0.202.
The mean simulated rate of underreporting is closest to the real value for z∗
CSEU(1,0)(the
constant in the regression is statistically indistinguishable from zero), though it does tend to
underestimate the variance. Broadly speaking, these results show that a pessimistic CSEU
model is capable of providing part of the explanation for the tax compliance puzzle in the
US case, without the need for the probability distortion functions of the RDEU model that
were used in Arcand and Rota-Graziosi (2004).
225 The cost to taxpayers of ambiguity in the tax code
W h a ti st h em a g n i t u d eo ft h el o s si n c u r r e db yat a x p a y e ra sar e s u l to ft h ea m b i g u i t y
concerning the penalty rate? In this section, we establish results concerning the premia
that taxpayers would be willing to pay for the elimination of risk, ambiguity, or both, in the
tax code. Our purpose in doing so is to establish orders of magnitude that will allow us
to confront our theoretical predictions with the actual cost of preparing tax returns. Our
interpretation of the use of paid preparers in thus motivated by a desire by taxpayers to
move from a situation of Knightian uncertainty to one of conventional risk.
An approach which is close in spirit to the one developed here is provided by Fox and
Tversky (1995), who explore the "comparative ignorance hypothesis", according to which
ambiguity aversion depends upon comparisons with more familiar events or with the opinions
of more knowledgeable individuals. We view professional accountants as an extreme example
of this hypothesis: such agents do not face uncertainty when they ﬁll in the tax forms of
their clients. Moreover, in some countries (such as France), these professionals are able to
take out insurances against the risk of errors or lawsuits, thereby protecting their clients.
In the US, a good indicator of the complexity of the tax code is the time required
to prepare and ﬁle a tax return. Based on IRS estimates, between 1997 and 2003 the time
required to complete and ﬁle a tax return (both short and long forms) grew approximately 46
percent, from 6.3 hours to 9.1 hours. This increase in time burden results from a combination
of new tax law provisions and more taxpayers using Form 1040 (the long form) and fewer
taxpayers using the two short forms (Form 1040A and Form 1040EZ). The growth in time
burden could explain, in part, the simultaneous increase in the number of taxpayers using
paid preparers: in 1997, 51.9 percent of taxpayers used a paid preparer versus 55.6 percent
in 2002.
235.1 The risk and ambiguity premia under CSEU with NEO-additive
capacities
Before considering the speciﬁc case of the tax compliance gamble, it is worthwhile estab-
lishing a general result concerning the premia that decisionmakers will be willing to pay in
order to eliminate risk and ambiguity, on the one hand, and ambiguity alone, on the other.
Lemma 3 (Risk and ambiguity premia "in the small" under CSEU with NEO-additive ca-
pacities) Consider a gamble (qn,kε n;qn−1,kε n−1;...;qi,kε i;...;q2,kε 2;q1,kε 1) with zero ex-
pected value (
Pi=n




i,w h e r eεn <ε n−1 < ... < 0 < ... <
ε2 <ε 1,a n dk is a scalar. Then a second order approximation to the risk premium associated









1 − (γεn + λε1)
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Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x .
This Lemma is important in that it shows that it is possible to separate the willingness to
pay for the elimination of risk and ambiguity into two components. To see why, note that the
standard expression for the risk premium under EU is given by πEU(t;.)=t2
2 σ2
εA(y).T h e
diﬀerence between the two, πA
CSEU(t;.) ≡ πRA
CSEU(t;.) − πEU(t;.), represents the willingness











1 − (γεn + λε1)





As is true for other non-EU models of decisionmaking, the premia given in Lemma 3 and
in equation (6) remain non-zero even in the presence of a linear utility function (u00 =0 ).13
5.2 Premia in the tax compliance gamble
How much would the taxpayer be willing to pay in order to eliminate ambiguity concerning
the penalty rates that she faces? Our result in the context of the tax compliance gamble is
the following:
13 For example, see Courtault and Gayant (1998) for the RDEU case.

















θ). Then a second-order approximation to the premium ϕRA for eliminating
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Figure 8: The two risk premia, using the usual three point distribution of penalty rates
and the following parameterization: u(x)=−e−νx
ν ,ν=0 .05,y=1 0 0 0 , t =0 .3,p=0 .03,
θ1 =0 ,q 1 =0 .5,µ θ =0 .25, σ2
θ ∈ [0,3].
Figure 8 illustrates Proposition 5 by computing the risk and "pure" ambiguity premia
for diﬀerent values of γ and λ, as a function of the variance σ2
θ of our usual three-point
distribution. The most striking (though unsurprizing, in light of Proposition 5) aspects
25of the simulation are, ﬁrst, that the premia are signiﬁcantly higher for pessimistic CSEU
decisionmakers than for the EU case and, second, that the ambiguity portion of the premium
appears to account for a major portion of the total. This highlights our interest in the use
of professional accountants in preparing tax returns. While one interpretation would view
their use as being motivated by a desire to reduce the risk associated with the tax compliance
gamble, Figure 8 suggests that, once CSEU preferences are allowed for, risk constitutes a
relatively minor concern, compared with ambiguity per se.
6 Should tax authorities reduce ambiguity?
Previous theoretical studies, in addition to the present one, have suggested that some tax
code complexity might exist by design in order to achieve increased revenues (Scotchmer and
Slemrod (1989), Slemrod (1989)). In a controlled experimental study Alm, Jackson, and
McKee (1992a) also ﬁnd that greater uncertainty in either tax due, ﬁne amount or detection
probability results in increased compliance. However, when a public good is introduced,
reporting compliance actually declined among subject participants. The authors explain
that the introduction of a public good causes taxpayer decisions to become interdependent
whereas in the absence of a public good compliance decisions are made independently. The
authors conclude that by introducing more uncertainty into the tax code “not only are
individuals made worse oﬀ... but the government may also lose tax revenues.”
Much of the theoretical literature emphasizes how complexity elevates the level of uncer-
tainty for the taxpayer but ignores the more practical issue that often increased complexity
is accompanied by greater opportunities to evade. For example, Graetz (1999) argues that
growing tax law complexity has led to more evasion in the U.S., although he fails to present
any evidence of this trend. Highly complicated instructions on tax forms can cause many
well-intentioned taxpayers to make mistakes causing the tax authority to expend more money
and eﬀort to ﬁx. Greater complexity also gives rise to “gray” areas which might be exploited
by some taxpayers and paid preparers. Furthermore, signiﬁcant and frequent changes to the
26tax law may lead increasing numbers of taxpayers to rely on paid preparers out of fear they
might be paying too much in tax. Therefore, the combination of more evasion opportunities
and higher audit costs in addition to the greater burden on taxpayers, both in terms of time
and money, tilts the argument against the use of ambiguity for the sole purpose of promoting
tax compliance. We formalize this fundamental tradeoﬀ, or at least the deterrence versus
increased audit costs portion of it, in the game-theretic context that follows.
6.1 A simple tax compliance game
In this section, we consider a simultaneous move game between the IRS and the taxpayer,
which can be thought of empirically as corresponding to a "face-to-face" audit. The IRS
chooses the audit rate (p), while the taxpayer chooses her level of underreporting (z). Each
player’s strategy set is a closed and bounded real-valued interval: [0,1] for the IRS and [0,y]
for the taxpayer. Moreover, the IRS is assumed to be risk- and ambiguity-neutral, which
corresponds to setting γ = λ =0in its CSEU preference functional. In the spirit of Graetz,
R e i n g a n u m ,a n dW i l d e( 1 9 8 6 ) ,t h eI R S ’ so b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o ni sg i v e nb y
Π(.;p)=t(y − z)+p(1 + µθ)tz − c(ξ,p), (7)
where t(y − z) represents tax receipts on declared income, p(1 + µθ)tz corresponds to the
expected value of penalties collected on non-compliant taxpayers who are audited, while
c(ξ,p) is the cost of implementing an audit rate p, given a level of complexity ξ of the






∂p2 > 0 and
∂2c(ξ,p)
∂p∂ξ > 0:
the cost of implementing a given audit rate is increasing in the complexity of the auditing
procedure and the cost of implementing an audit is increasing and convex in the audit rate
one wishes to implement; moreover the marginal impact of complexity on the cost of an
audit is increasing in the audit rate one wishes to implement. The convexity assumption
ensures that the IRS’s objective function is concave in p, while the assumption on the second
27order cross-partial derivative ensures that the optimal audit rate is a decreasing function of
the complexity of the audit, ceteris paribus.
We assume that the complexity of auditing is a function of the degree of ambiguity
associated with the tax code. Our working hypothesis is that greater ambiguity in the tax
code is associated with greater complexity in auditing returns, which we formalize by posing






dθ2 > 0 and ρ is the parameter of increasing risk of Rothschild and Stiglitz. By a
trivial application of Lemma 2, this speciﬁcation implies that an increase in the ambiguity of
t h et a xc o d em o d e l l e da sa nM P I Ro fq(θ,ρ) will increase the complexity of an audit, while
an α−squeeze of q(θ) as given in Deﬁnition 5 will decrease it. The key issue in determining











dθ > 0.L e t
p
∗ (.;z)=a r gm a x
p∈[0,1]
Π(.;p) (8)
denote the solution to the IRS’s maximization program. By implicit diﬀerentiation of the
FOC that corresponds to (8), it is then immediate that
∂p∗(.;z)
∂z > 0. T h et a x p a y e r ’ so p t i m a l




∂p < 0. The action space of each player is continuous, and the payoﬀ
functions Π(.;p) and CSEU(γ,λ;z) are continuous.
The concept of a Nash equilibrium has been extended to CSEU axiomatics by Dow and
Werlang (1994), Lo (1996), Marinacci (2000), and Eichberger and Kelsey (2000). We use
the concept of Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (EUA) developed by Eichberger, Kelsey, and
Schipper (2004) to establish the existence of an EUA.14 The EUA values of underreporting
and the penalty rate, denoted by (pEUA,zEUA), are then given by the solution in (p,z) of the
14 See their Proposition 3.2, p. 11.
28pair of equations given by (8) and optimal compliance behavior as characterized in Proposi-
tion 1. Figure 9 illustrates the IRS’s reaction function, as well as that of the taxpayer, for
diﬀerent values of γ and λ, for a parameterization that is slightly diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a tu s e d
previously.15 As would be expected, greater pessimism on the part of taxpayers leads to












Figure 9: Reaction functions under the parameterization: u(x)=−e−Rx
R , R =0 .05,
µθ =1 .2, θn =2 ,a n dσθ =0 .025.
6.2 Changes in the distribution of penalty rates and equilibrium
underreporting
In this section, we consider the impact of changes in the distribution of penalty rates on the
equilibrium level of underreporting. As in section 4, we consider three diﬀerent changes
in the distribution of θ:a nM P I R ,a nα−squeeze, and an RPIA. We conclude by provid-
15 This change in parametrization is made purely for esthetic reasons.
29ing an initial assessment of the ability of our theoretical construct to mimic the empirical
relationship linking tax code complexity to underreporting and the willingness to pay for
accountants’ services.
6.2.1 An MPIR, an α−squeeze and an RPIA

























While apparently complex, the interpretation of equation (9) is extremely straightforward:
the function ω(θ) characterizes the degree of convexity in θ of ζ(θ) and therefore the sensi-
tivity of the complexity ξ of an audit with respect to an MPIR. The net impact on zEUA of
an MPIR is the result of two eﬀects of opposite sign. On the one hand, an MPIR reduces
underreporting, by Proposition 2(ii). On the other, an MPIR decreases the IRS’s optimal
audit rate (because ξ increases), thereby leading to higher underreporting. The outcome
in terms of dzEUA
dρ then depends upon the relative magnitudes of these two eﬀects. The
value of ω(θ) implicitly deﬁned in (9) corresponds to a situation in which the two eﬀects
exactly cancel out and in which an MPIR has no eﬀect on zEUA. The following Proposition
formalizes this intuition by characterizing the impact of an increase in ambiguity on zEUA,
as modelled by an MPIR in the distribution of penalty rates:






= sign[ω(θ) − e ω(θ,ρ)].
Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x .
Proposition 6 is illustrated in Figure 10 (in the Appendix), where we use our usual three
point distribution and specify ζ(θ)=θ
η,η > 1 and c(ξ,p)=c
2ξ
2p2.W e p l o t zEUA
y as a
function of σ2
θ,f o rη ranging from 1 to 1.3. In the case of η =1 , the MPIR has no eﬀect
o nt h ec o s to ft h ea u d i t( b e c a u s e
d2ζ(θ)
dθ2 =0 , by Lemma 2(i)) and the equilibrium outcome
30stems from the "pure" eﬀect of the change in σ2
θ on underreporting: the curves in the four
panels of Figure 10 are therefore all downward-sloping for η =1(as was the case in Figure
3). As the degree of convexity of ζ(θ) increases, the shape of the curve changes. For the
EU case or a relatively optimistic taxpayer ((γ,λ)=( 0 ,0.9)), zEUA
y is increasing in σ2
θ (see
the two left-hand panels in Figure 10). In contrast, the two right-hand panels of Figure 10
assume that the taxpayer is relatively pessimistic. For (γ,λ)=( 0 .6,0.1), for example, a
value of η =1 .3 leads to zEUA
y being initially increasing in σ2
θ (for very low levels of σ2
θ), with
the threshold level being rapidly attained: the curves become downward-sloping thereafter.
In Figure 11 (in the Appendix) we carry out the same exercise, but for an α−squeeze
with the distribution of penalty rates given by the arcsin density. We consider values of
η that range from 1 to 5. Because of the eﬀect of the α−squeeze on the extrema of the
distribution of penalty rates, which aﬀects not only underreporting (as seen earlier) but the
cost of an audit as well, the interactions are more complex, though the pattern that emerges
graphically is always the same: regardless of the parameterization in terms of γ and λ, zEUA
y
is always an inverted U-shaped function of α. The contrast with the partial equilibrium
impact of an increase in α on underreporting given in Figure 5 is striking. Consider the
case of a pessimistic consumer (top right-hand panel in Figure 11), with (γ,λ)=( 1 ,0):i n
this case, Figure 5 showed that the partial equilibrium impact of an increase in α was to
decrease underreporting in an unambiguous manner. In the game-theoretic context, on the
other hand, this pattern only emerges once a threshold level of α has been crossed: for low
levels of α, the decrease in the cost of an audit caused by the α−squeeze (and thus the
increase in the underlying audit probability) is suﬃcient to more than oﬀset the tendency
of the taxpayer to underreport less, the equilibrium result being that zEUA
y is increasing in
α for low values of the latter.
Finally, in Figure 12 (in the Appendix) and 13 (below), we consider the impact of an
RPIA(2), as given in (5), on zEUA
y , for our three point distribution of penalty rates. In
Figure 12, we plot zEUA
y as a function of ∆ for η =1 ,2,3.N o t e , f o r η =1or η =2 ,
31that the deﬁnition of an RPIA implies that there is no impact of a change in ∆ on the
cost of an audit. The impact of an increase in ∆ on the equilibrium outcome is therefore
entirely determined by the partial equilibrium eﬀect on underreporting that was considered
in Figure 6. This implies that, for the optimistic taxpayers considered in two left-hand
panels of Figure 12, zEUA
y is increasing in ∆, whereas the opposite holds for the pessimistic
taxpayers considered in the two right-hand panels.16 This is highlighted in Figure 13, where
we restrict our attention to η =2and where the impact of a rise in ∆ follows exactly the
same pattern as in Figure 6.
















y ,a s∆ varies between 0 and 0.2, with the following parameterization:
u(x)=−e−νx
ν ,ν=0 .05,y=1 0 , t =0 .3,p=0 .03, θ1 =0 .2,q 1 =0 .5, µθ =0 .25, σ2
θ =0 .08.
16 Note that while an RPIA(2) does aﬀect the cost of an audit when η =3 , its impact is not suﬃciently
great to overturn the pattern that emerges in the two preceding cases, and the eﬀect of an increase in ∆
remains consonant with that uncovered in a partial equilibrium setting.
32Adjusted Mean Complexity Predicted Willingness Estimated
gross AGI indicator tax change to pay cost of
income (IRS estimate % of AGI audit
category (AGI) mean median of evasion)
yρ , σ 2
θ,ρ q, 1
α,∆,ξ z ϕ RA or ϕA c(ξ,p)
$0 to < $15K $7 4 1 2 1,58 1 $ 167 0,99% $474
$15K to < $30K $2 19 6 5 1,68 1 $ 286 0,50% $495
$30K to < $45K $3 69 2 7 1,96 2 $ 370 0,36% $559
$45K to < $60K $5 20 7 5 2,23 2 $ 466 0,32% $628
$60K to < $90K $7 30 3 6 2,45 2 $ 540 0,29% $691
$90K to < $120K $102 845 2,58 2 $ 909 0,26% $731
$120K or more $334 194 2,82 3 $2 221 0,13% $811
total $5 04 7 7 1,94 1 $ 451 0,29% $554
Table 2: Taxable income, complexity, the willingness to pay for accountants’ services, and
the cost of an audit: the US in the year 2000
6.3 Empirical evidence (preliminary and incomplete)
Though historical time series evidence does not exist in terms of the cost to taxpayers of
preparing their returns, or of their use of professional accountants, some data do exist on a
cross-sectional basis, for diﬀerent levels of taxable income. Data also exist that allow one to
link complexity to the level of underreporting. The IRS’s Compliance Information Research
System (CRIS) provides an indicator of the complexity of tax returns. In turn, Guyton,
O’Hare, Stavrianos, and Toder (2003) construct a measure of the "out of pocket money
burden" of preparing a tax return, which allows one to establish a relationship between level
of income, the complexity of preparing a return, and a rough measure of the willingness to
pay for accountants’ services. A coherent measure of z in this context is provided by the
"predicted tax change", an in-house IRS measure of evasion (this is not the same as the AGI
wage gap measures presented earlier). The available data are presented in Table 2.
6.3.1 Complexity and the cost of an audit
With respect to the relationship between tax code complexity and the cost of an audit,
evidence is available that allows one to assess the validity of the assumptions posed earlier.
The time to complete the average audit of an individual non-business taxpayer grew from
339 hours in Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 to 19 hours in FY2003, a jump of over 100 percent.
Much of this increase can be attributed to passage of the 1998 taxpayer bill of rights that
required the IRS to allow taxpayers more time to settle amounts due. However, some of this
increase can be attributed to added complexity of the returns (GAO 2001). How much of
this increase is due to increased complexity would be diﬃcult to identify and no studies have
been conducted to separate the various contributing factors. However, if we assume that of
the average increase of 10 hours audit time 2 hours is due to increased complexity and further
assume an average examiner cost of $50 per hour (including beneﬁts, leave, etc.), then the
added complexity would boost per return audit cost by $100. Based on the data presented
in Table 2, the relationship between complexity and the cost of an audit for FY2000 is given
by
c =$ 5 0× 4.7829e
0.4331ξ,R
2 =0 .8312.
This relationship is convex, as assumed in our theoretical discussion.
6.3.2 Complexity and the willingness to pay for accountant’s services
The estimated relationship between the cost of preparing a return (and thus the willingness
to pay for accountant services) and complexity is given by
ϕ
RA =$ 1 1 .4e
1.2377ξ,R
2 =0 .9538.
Though this increasing relationship between complexity and an empirical proxy for ϕRA
mimics the theoretical relationship plotted in Figure 8, the latter was a partial equilibrium
result that did not include the interaction with the IRS in the context of the tax-compliance
game. Further theoretical results are needed in order to establish whether such a pattern
would emerge as the equilibrium outcome.
346.3.3 Complexity and underreporting (incomplete)
INCOMPLETE: contrast relationship using mean versus relationship using median AGI
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper has shown that ambiguity, in the sense of Knightian uncertainty, concerning the
penalty rate, generates a tax compliance problem that is very diﬀerent from the EU or RDEU
cases. In the context of a CSEU model with the NEO-additive capacities of Chateauneuf,
Eichberger, and Grant (2004), we have characterized optimal compliance behavior and stud-
ied how the latter varies as a function of various measures of ambiguity.
We have shown that taxpayers may suﬀer signiﬁcant welfare losses as a result of the
ambiguity concerning penalty rates, and would be willing to pay a substantial fraction of
their income in order to eliminate it. Most of this willingness to pay appears to stem from
pure ambiguity concerns, not from risk.
Finally, in the context of a simple tax compliance game where the IRS sets the audit
probability and taxpayers choose their level of compliance, we have shown that the key
parameter, in terms of the eﬀect on underreporting of a simpler or a more complex tax code,
is the increase in the cost of an audit associated with greater complexity. When the increase
in the cost of an audit associated with increasing complexity is suﬃciently high, equilibrium
underreporting will be an increasing function of complexity. In this case, it would clearly
be in the interest of the IRS to simplify the tax code.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1: optimal compliance behavior





where CSEU (γ,λ) is deﬁned in (1). The necessary First Order Condition (FOC) that implicitly charac-
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CSEUu00(y) into the FOC allows one to write:
0=[ 1 − p − p(θnγ + θ1λ +( 1− γ − λ)µθ)]u0 (y) (A.10)
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θ. An interior solution will exist if and only if:
[1 − p − p(θnγ + θ1λ +( 1− γ − λ)µθ)]
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which is equivalent to the condition that:
p<p CSEU (γ,λ)=
1
1+θnγ + θ1λ +( 1− γ − λ)µθ
. (11)
17 The SOC is satisﬁed because of the concavity of u(.).
















, if p<p CSEU (γ,λ)
0, otherwise
¥ (12)










u(y − θtz)=t2z [2u00(y − θtz) − θtzu000(y − θtz)] < 0.
Application of Lemma 2 then yields the result given in the Proposition. Note also that a second-order





































Evaluating this expression at the optimal value of z∗





(1 − p − pµθ − p[γ (θn − µθ)+λ(θ1 − µθ)])
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This expression will be decreasing in σ2
θ as long as 1−γ −λ>0, as will z∗
CSEU as given in Proposition 1.¥
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3: impact of an MPIR under smooth
ambiguity aversion
The FOC which implicitly deﬁnes the optimal level z∗
SAA of underreporting is given by:
0=t
·
(1 − p)u0(y + tz∗
SAA)
−p[θnqu0(y − θntz∗










SAA)+( 1− q)u(y − θ1tz∗
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which, applying Lemma 2(i), implies that dSAA
dρq < 0, as long as the taxpayer is ambiguity-averse (φ
00 < 0).
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2 [1 + (θn + θ1)A(y)tz]tz∗
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00 (.) < 0.




A.4 An explicit second-order approximation to optimal underre-
porting under smooth ambiguity aversion, with a Beta distri-



























where H (θi)=1− p − pθi, ∀i =1 ,n.
40A.5 Proof of Proposition 4: impact of a squeeze on welfare and
optimal compliance behavior
C o n s i d e rt h ee x p r e s s i o nf o rt h ew e l f a r eo ft h et a x payer at the optimum, given in (13). Applying the
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γ (αθn +[ 1− α]µθ)
2
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Straightforward but tedious diﬀerentiation of these expressions with respect to α establishes the Proposition.¥
A.6 An α-squeeze when penalty rates are distributed according





4(2− p[3 + α(γ − λ)])
8+p(−6+α(α +4 γ (1 + λ) − (4 − α)λ))
.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 3: the risk premium under CSEU with NEO-
additive capacities
The CSEU of the gamble in question is given by:




Deﬁne the risk-premium π(k;.) in the usual manner by CSEU − u(y − π(k;.)) ≡ 0. Diﬀerentiating the
previous identity twice with respect to k yields
0 ≡ γεnu0 (y + kεn)+λε1u0 (y + kε1)
+(1− γ − λ)
n X
i=1
qiεiu0 (y + kεi)+π0(k;.)u0 (y − π(k;.)),
0 ≡ γε2
nu00 (y + kεn)+λε2




iu00 (y + kεi)
+π00(k;.)u0 (y − π(k;.)) − [π0(k;.)]
2 u00 (y − π(k;.)).
Evaluate the initial identity and the two derivatives at k =0 . This yields:
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The premium for eliminating ambiguity alone, for its part, is implicitly deﬁned by CSEU−
Pi=n
i=1 qiu(y + kεi − π(k;.)) =
















A.8 Proof of Proposition 5: risk premia for the tax compliance
gamble under CSEU with NEO-additive capacities
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The premium ϕRA associated with eliminating both risk and ambiguity concerning the value of the penalty
rate is implicitly deﬁned by:
CSEU (γ,λ;z)=pu
¡
y − µθtz − ϕRA¢
+( 1− p)u(y + tz − ϕRA).
A second-order Taylor expansion of the RHS of this expression yields:
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Now consider premium ϕA for eliminating only ambiguity concerning the penalty rate, while risk remains.
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 6: comparative statics of the equilibrium
under ambiguity (EUA) of the tax-compliance game
The FOC which implicitly deﬁnes the optimal penalty rate is given by






while optimal compliance behavior is given by the second-order approximation derived in Proposition 1.
Evaluating the preceding FOC at z = z∗
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y as a function of σ2
θ for the following parameterization: u(x)=−e−νx
ν ,ν=0 .05,y= 100,t=0 .3,p=0 .03, c =1 0 , θ1 =0 ,
q1 =0 .5, µθ =0 .25,σ 2
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y using penalty rates distributed according to the arcsin density and with the following parameterization: u(x)=−e−νx
ν , ν =0 .5,
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y as a function of ∆, with the following parameterization: u(x)=−e−νx
ν ,ν=0 .05,y=1 0 , t =0 .3,p=0 .03, c =1 0 , θ1 =0 .2,
q1 =0 .5, µθ =0 .25, σ2

















y as a function of ∆, with the following parameterization: u(x)=−e−νx
ν ,ν=0 .05,y=1 0 , t =0 .3,p=0 .03, c =1 0 , θ1 =0 .2,
q1 =0 .5, µθ =0 .25, σ2
θ =0 .08.